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Abstract
Condorcets famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the
correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about
voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I
carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justied
depends on the notion of probability considered; (ii) none of the notions renders
both premises simultaneously justied. Under the perhaps most interesting
notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
1 Introduction
Roughly stated, the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem1 (CJT) asserts that if a
group (jury, population, etc.) takes a majority vote between two alternatives of
which exactly one is objectively correct, and if the voters satisfy two technical
conditions, competence and independence, then the probability that the major-
ity picks the correct alternative increases to one (certainty) as the group size
tends to innity. Though mathematically elementary, this result is striking in
its overly positive conclusion. If majority judgments are indeed most probably
correct in large societies, majoritarian democracy receives strong support from
an epistemic perspective.
This paper goes back to the very basics and aims to answer whether the
theorems two premises are justied. The answer will be seen to depend in a
rather clear-cut way on the kind of probability (uncertainty2) considered; un-
fortunately, in each case exactly one of the premises is not justied. A central
distinction will be whether only voting behaviour or also the decision problem
voters face is subject to uncertainty. I suggest that this distinction marks the
di¤erence between two versions in which the basic CJT can be found in the
1See Condorcets (1785) writings at the dawn of the French Revolution.
2I use the term uncertaintyin a general sense, that is, not only when referring to someones
subjective uncertainty but also when referring to an objective probability.
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literature;3 I accordingly label these versions the xed-problem CJT and the
variable-problem CJT, respectively. In the xed-problem CJT, competence is
the problematic assumption, whereas in the variable-problem CJT, independ-
ence is problematic. So the two versions of the CJT, which might have appeared
to be just notational variants, are in fact fundamentally distinct.
Let me start by sketching a tempting but sloppy argument that seems to
support the CJTs two premises, and hence its striking conclusion. Consider,
for instance, a group of judges in a collegial court facing an acquit or convict
choice in a criminal law case; convictis correct if and only if the defendant
has committed the crime. First, the CJTs competence assumption requires
(roughly) that each voters probability of making a correct judgment exceeds
1/2. While on a particular criminal law case a judge may easily be mistaken
say, if there is highly misleading evidence4 surely such cases are rather the
exception than the rule, and so within the large class of related court cases a
voters rate (frequency) of correct judgments exceeds 1/2. Hence the compet-
ence assumption holds. Second, the CJTs independence assumption requires
(roughly) that it be probabilistically independent whether judge 1 is right, judge
2 is right, etc. While it is true that the problems circumstances such as evid-
ence observed by all judges or the process of group deliberation  can make
it likely that the judges cast the same vote (hence all are right or all wrong),
probabilistic independence is secured if by probabilitywe mean probability
conditional on the problem; indeed, conditional on the same exact body of
evidence, process of group deliberation, and so on, nothing is left that could
create a probabilistic dependence between the voters (who do not look on each
othersballot sheets).
What has gone wrong in the argument? To justify the competence as-
sumption, I have appealed to a variable decision problem, one that is picked
at random from a class of relevant problems. But to justify the independence
assumption, I have xed (i.e. conditionalised on) the decision problem, with
its particular body of evidence, process of group deliberation, and so on. One
cannot have it both ways.
More generally, the source of the disagreement on which premises of the
CJT are justied is that di¤erent authors or branches of the literature more or
less implicitly rely on di¤erent notions of uncertainty, ranging from the objective
uncertainty of a random process to the subjective uncertainty of a social plan-
ner or, in game-theoretic models, of the voters themselves; and ranging from
uncertainty about votes given a specic decision problem to uncertainty about
both votes and the decision problem. I believe that most arguments made in
the literature for or against some premise are correct under the authors notion
3Technically, the two versions di¤er in whether voterscompetence and independence are
required to hold unconditionally or conditional on what alternative is correct.
4For instance, if in the court room the innocent defendant cries out "I am guilty" to protect
the true murderer.
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of uncertainty, and incorrect under other notions. For instance, group delibera-
tion prior to voting is often viewed as undermining independence (Rawls 1971,
Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983, Ladha 1992, 1995, Dietrich and List 2004), or
as not undermining independence provided voters are isolated once it comes to
voting (Waldron in Estlund et al. 1989, Estlund 2007). The latter is correct
if the decision problem (including specic circumstances) is xed, the former if
the problem is variable. Also, shared information (Lindley 1985, Dietrich and
List 2004), opinion leaders, or other inuences (Nitzan and Paroush 1984, 1985,
Owen 1986, Boland 1989, Boland, Proschan, and Tong 1989, Estlund 1994) are
often taken to induce correlations, which is again correct in the variable-problem
setting. I shall consider group deliberation, common information, and opinion
leaders as examples of what I more generally call the circumstances, dened as
the collection of common causes/inuences of votes, among which might also
be the room temperature and singing birds.
In some important aspects, the analysis I o¤er resembles or generalises exist-
ing arguments,5 and it shows their underlying notions of uncertainty/probability.
My main goal is to clarify a discussion that seems to su¤er from some confusions
and mutual misunderstandings.
The large literature on the CJT contains a number of technical renements;
besides the papers just cited, see, for instance, Young (1988), Berend and
Paroush (1998), List and Goodin (2001), and Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006).
A recent game-theoretic literature investigates whether sincere or informative
voting is a rational strategy (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and
Pesendorfer 1997, Conghlan 2000, Koriyama and Szentes 1995); I have some
comment on this approach in Section 6.
2 Voters, decision problems, circumstances
Throughout we consider a group of individuals (judges, citizens, experts, etc.),
labelled i = 1; 2; :::; n, where n ( 2) is the group size. To be able to address
the CJT, we allow the group size to vary. We think of the group of size n
as containing the rst n individuals of an innite sequence of potential voters
i = 1; 2; 3; ::: Although this paper discusses the CJT in its asymptotic version,
the critique of competence and independence assumptions applies similarly to
non-asymptotic CJTs.6
The group decides by majority voting between two alternatives, labelled 0
and 1, such as acquitor convictthe defendant. By assumption, one of the
alternatives is factually correct and the other one incorrect. Here, correctness
5For instance, Ladha (1993, sect. 2) seems to make similar points to mine. Also, Dietrich
and List (2004) make similar points; for instance, about misleading evidence.
6An non-asymptotic CJT states that, under certain conditions, a group is more likely to
get it right (in majority) than a smaller group or a single individual. An asymptotic CJT, by
contrast, is concerned with the limiting correctness probability as n!1.
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can mean di¤erent things, but importantly, it constitutes an (unknown) object-
ive fact; for instance, in choosing between acquit and convict, the correct
alternative is given by whether or not the defendant has in fact committed the
crime.7 Each voter votes for the alternative he believes to be correct.8
The models discussed below di¤er in whether the groups decision problem
is xed. But what counts as part of the decision problem? I dene a de-
cision problem as the task of nding a certain correct alternative x (0 or 1)
under certain circumstances c. Thus a decision problem is characterised by two
components:
 The correct alternative or state x. It is either 0 or 1.
 The circumstances c individuals face. Some are of an evidential kind,
others of a non-evidential kind.
Evidential circumstances are generally observable facts that sup-
port the correctness of alternative 0 or 1, including the specic nature
of alternatives 0 and 1 (Is it acquit Mr. Smithvs. convict him to 7
years prison? Or acquit himvs. convict him to 3 years prison?),
and several observable events such as, again in a court case, nger-
prints, a witness report, the defendants facial expression during the
trial, relevant statistical data, the process of group deliberation, etc.
Non-evidential circumstances are events that carry no information
on which alternative is correct but may a¤ect di¤erent voters in their
voting behaviour, such as room temperature while voting, whether
birds are singing (which might induce optimistic belief in the defend-
ants innocence). One might regard non-evidential circumstances as
factors that a¤ect whether voters observe evidential circumstances
and how they interpret them.9
7In general, the assumption that one alternative is objectively correct is natural in (at
least) two cases. First, the decision problem might be to say yesor no to some factual
proposition (hypothesis) H, such as CO2 emissions cause climate change; the objectively
correct answer is then simply given by whether H is factually true or false. Second, the group
might choose between two actions (e.g., two day trips), where all the individuals share the
same preferences (e.g., to make the cheaper trip, with possible disagreements on which trip is
cheaper); the objective correctness of an alternative then comes from the shared preferences.
Despite the obvious di¤erence between the two the goal is now to satisfy (shared) desires,
not to form true beliefs one might recast the action-choice problem as a belief-formation
problem, namely as the problem of knowing whether the rst action satises the individuals
preferences more than the second action.
8The question of whether such sincere voting is strategically optimal is discussed in Section
6.
9Non-evidential circumstances can a¤ect a voters beliefs (subjective probabilities) either
through enabling him to observe some evidence on which he then conditionalises (e.g., singing
birds make voters see and conditionalise on the innocent smile of the defendant), or in a non-
Bayesian way, i.e. without voters observing evidence (e.g., singing birds might cause voters
to simply raise their prior probability of innocence). The latter might be thought of as a
change of prior rather than a move to a conditional probability; it might be called a dynamic
inconsistency of beliefs.
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A subtle question is that of what exactly should (not) be called a part of
the circumstances (and hence of the description of the decision problem). The
more is included, the less randomness is left in voting behaviour conditional
on the decision problem. Voter-specic information (such as whether voter 3
had good sleep, or whether he saw the defendants smile) is not part of the
circumstances; otherwise we would risk eliminating any randomness in voting
behaviour conditional on the problem. In Section 3.3 I suggest conceptualising
the circumstances as the common causes/factors of votes.
3 The xed-problemCJT: objective uncertainty
about voters given a specic decision prob-
lem
Some authors perhaps only a minority, and perhaps mainly when arguing in
favour of the independence condition10 think of the decision problem as being
xed. This notion of uncertainty is not only needed to defend independence,
but it also is the best way of making sense of a popular version of the CJT, to
be called the xed-problem CJT.
3.1 The xed-problem CJT
I now formally state the xed-problem model and CJT. Votes are represented
by random variables V1; V2; ::: that take values in the set f0; 1g, where Vi takes
the value 0 (1) if individual i votes/judges that alternative 0 (1) is correct.11 In
this section, the probability function12 is denoted Pr and represents objective
uncertainty given some xed problem, as described by a xed correct alternative
x (0 or 1) and xed circumstances (see Section 2). One may interpret Pr as
arising from an underlying probability function P (studied in Section 4) by
10For instance, the popular comparison of the votes of voters 1, 2, ... with the outcomes
of independent coin tosses assumes a xed decision problem, because the shape of the coin is
xed rather than random.
11I assume throughout that an individuals vote Vi does not depend on the group size n,
thereby neglecting that circumstances (in particular, group deliberation) may be group-size-
dependent. This idealisation is not essential for the arguments for/against the two premises
(to avoid it, one would need to make is vote group-size-dependent, i.e. use random variables
V ni representing is vote in a group of size n). An interpretational subtlety is that individual
is vote Vi more precisely represents how i would vote if i is among the voters, i.e. if i  n.
12Formally, Pr is the probability function of an underlying probability space on which
all random variables V1; V2; ::: are dened. Like in the frameworks of later sections, these
technicalities are left implicit and need not bother the reader. (Formally, a probability space
consists of a set of worlds 
 on which all random variables are dened and a -algebra of events
E  
 on which a probability function is dened. I use standard notation; e.g. Pr(Vi = x)
more precisely stands for Pr(f! 2 
 : Vi(!) = xg).)
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conditionalising on the particular problem.13
The rst premise of the CJT requires votes to be probabilistically independ-
ent from each other:
Independence (Ind). The votes V1; V2; ::: of individuals 1, 2, ... are independ-
ent.
Now to the second premise. An individual is competence (on the given
problem) is dened as the probability pi := Pr(Vi = x) that he votes for x,
the correct alternative. I stress that pi represents is competence not within a
general class of problems (e.g., all criminal court problems) but on the specic
problem at hand; more on this in Section 3.2. In its strongest version, the
competence assumption states as follows:
Competence on the problem (Com). Competence on the problem pi =
Pr(Vi = x) exceeds 1/2 and is the same across individuals i.
The unrealistic requirement of equally competent individuals is more de-
manding than necessary for the CJT; the following weaker requirement still
su¢ ces:
Competence-on-average on the problem (Com). Average competence on
the problem p := limn!1(p1 + :::+ pn)=n (exists14 and) exceeds 1=2.
I now state the classic CJT in one of its versions, which I interpret as the
xed-problemversion. I use the weaker competence assumption (Com), but
of course the result stays true for the (more classical) assumption (Com).
The xed-problem CJT.15 If (Ind) and (Com) hold, the probability of a
correct majority outcome, Pr(#fi  n : Vi = xg > n=2), tends to one as the
group size n tends to innity.
As argued in the next two subsections, this theorems independence premise
can be defended, but its competence premise cannot be known to hold : know-
ing whether (Com) holds for this specic problem might be even harder than
13P captures objective uncertainty also about the problem, and Pr = P (:jPROBLEM =
problem), where the (highly multi-dimensional) random variable PROBLEM represents the
randomly generated problem and problem is the particular problem considered here. Follow-
ing our conceptualisation of problems as state-circumstances pairs, we may view PROBLEM
as a pair (X;C) of a random state variable X and the random circumstances variable C; and
so, Pr = P (:jX = x;C = c).
14That is, the (nite) groups average competence, (p1 + ::: + pn)=n, converges as n ! 1
(rather than, say, oscillating), a very natural assumption in practice.
15See footnote 23 for a re-interpretation of uncertainty (probability Pr) that makes this
theorem a variable-problem CJT.
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knowing the true state x in the rst stage. To know whether (Com) holds, one
would have to know whether the specic problem involves misleading evidence,
which one can hardly know without knowing the true state x.
First, though, an important remark. In this sections xed-problem model
it would not make sense to distinguish between competence given that 0 is
correctand competence given that 1 is correct. To see why, recall that the
state x is xed (though unknown to an observer) and that probability rep-
resents objective chance (rather than an observers subjective belief). So, by
conditionalising on (say) alternative 0 being correct one conditionalises either
on a zero-probability event (if x is 1) or on a sure event (if x is 0); in the former
case the conditional probability is undened, in the latter it coincides with the
unconditional probability, i.e., with competence pi = Pr(Vi = x) simpliciter.
Using a pair of conditional competence parameters will become meaningful in
the variable-problem model (see Section 4) or for subjective rather than ob-
jective uncertainty (see Sections 5 and 6), though in the latter case voter is
(conditional or unconditional) correctness probabilities represent not is com-
petence but an observers beliefs about whether i votes correctly.
For completely analogous reasons, condition (Ind) requires unconditional
independence of the votes, not independence conditional on the state. Again,
this will change once we introduce uncertainty about the problem.
3.2 Competence: not known to hold
The problem is not that competence usually fails, but that one does not know
when it holds. Let me explain. Whether (Com) holds depends on whether the
problems circumstances make it easy to nd out the truth x. Average compet-
ence p is likely to be below 1/2 if the problem, more precisely its circumstances,
are misleading, that is, if either
 evidential circumstances are misleading, for instance if an innocent de-
fendant pretends to have committed the crime or nervously breaks out in
tears; or
 non-evidential circumstances have a fatal e¤ect on the votersabilities,
for instance if the optimistic singing of birds causes the judges to believe
in the innocence of a guilty defendant (see footnote 9 on the e¤ects of
non-evidential circumstances).
On the other hand, most problems do not have misleading circumstances,
and average competence p on the problem exceeds 1/2. In general, one might
interpret p as a measure for easiness of the problem, and 1   p as a measure
of di¢ culty or misleadingness (since 1   p is the average probability of voting
incorrectly).
Importantly, though, an observer the potential applier of the CJT, inter-
ested in whether the majority outcome is correct can usually not know how
easy or misleading the problem is, hence whether the voters are competent, indi-
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vidually or on average. Assessing whether (Com) holds for the specic problem
might even be harder than assessing the correct alternative x in the rst place.
The simple reason is that easiness and misleadingness are dened relative
to the (unknown) state x, i.e., relative to what alternative is correct. Circum-
stances are misleading if they suggestthe opposite of the truth x. What the
observer can often see is that circumstances strongly suggestsome state, say
suggestalternative 1s correctness, in which case the observer can guess that
Pr(Vi = 1) is close 1, at least on average over the group; but this only tells him
that average competence p is either close 1 (if x = 1) or close 0 (if x = 0). To
know which of these two cases applies, the observer would need to know the
state x, which he knows no more than the voters themselves.
3.3 Independence: holds provided we have conditional-
ised on all common causes
Unlike the competence assumption, independence (Ind) is arguably a safe as-
sumption provided that the circumstances of the problem (on which probability
is conditional) cover su¢ ciently many facts. Why this proviso? And what facts
exactly must be conditionalised upon? Suppose for instance that room temper-
ature is not taken to be part of the (xed) circumstances. Suppose further that
high temperature reduces judgmental ability. Then votes can be positively cor-
related, because each of them is positively correlated with the event of low room
temperature. In short, given that person 1 votes correctly, room temperature
is probably low, so that person 2 probably votes correctly too.
This reasoning would not go through if the common cause room temper-
aturewere xed, because then voter 1s vote would not have provided new
information on room temperature, hence not on voter 2s vote.
As the example suggests, independence is a reasonable assumption provided
that all common causes/factors of votes are held xed. Why must common (not
private) causes be xed? In general, we can think of a voters vote Vi as being
fully determined by the combination of a (large) set of causes, which can be
subdivided into private and common causes:
 Private causes/factors are facts that can a¤ect only is vote Vi, none of
the other votes, such as: evidence that only i can observe16, whether i
indeed observes it, whether i had good sleep last night, whether i was
listening properly while the witness was reporting, and so on.17
16Often there is none, so that all private causes are non-evidential.
17Private causes should not be confused with private information: a voters lack of sleep
may indeed be observed by others; what makes it a private cause is that votes of others are
not a¤ected by it. Moreover, note that whether a given (private or common) cause of is vote
makes a di¤erence may depend on other causes. For instance, suppose Vi has just two causes:
(1) what the evidence consists in, and (2) whether i observes the evidence. Then the rst
cause makes no di¤erence if the second cause takes the value not observed.
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 Common causes/factors are facts that can a¤ect more than one voters
vote, such as publicly observable evidence, room temperature, and even
the entire process of group deliberation prior to voting.
My suggestion is to identify the problems circumstances with the common
causes (a possibly rich set of facts).18 Then, since the problem (including its
circumstances) are xed, independence seems secured. This is vindicated by
Reichenbachs (1956) famous Common Cause Principle and more recently the
theory of Bayesian networks (e.g. Pearl 2000).19
But individual is private causes/factors are random variables (except from
background causes20), and this is precisely what makes is vote Vi random. In
fact, is vote could be viewed as a function Vi = fi(Ci), where Ci is the vector
of is private causes, hence a vector of random variables. Nevertheless, perhaps
not much objective uncertainty is left: Vi might be 1 with high probability, or 0
with high probability (meaning very high or very low competence on the specic
problem). This is so in particular in the (plausible) case that all causes to Vi with
evidential content (such as the witness report) are common rather than private.
In this case, all randomness in Vi comes from evidentially irrelevant private
factors (such how well voter i has slept last night) which might play no big role
in determining the vote. If, moreover, the voter is a Bayesian rational, then his
beliefs (hence his voting-behaviour) are entirely immune to non-evidential facts
(hunger or lack of sleep); his beliefs could change only through (conditionalising
on) evidence. For such a voter, Vi is deterministic, i.e., takes some value (0 or 1)
with objective certainty (again, given the xed circumstances). The possibility
of having conditionalised awaymost randomness in voting behaviour (and
hence in the majority outcome) potentially makes the xed-problem model less
attractive; yet xing the problem is what guarantees us independence.
18This would render the notion of circumstancesclear-cut, and hence also the notion of a
problem(i.e. a state-circumstances pair).
19According to the Common Cause Principle, variables in the world that do not causally
a¤ect each other (such as the votes V1; V2; :::; provided the voters do not look on each others
ballot sheets) are probabilistically independent conditional on their common causes. For
instance, two medical symptoms of a patient, coughing and feeling tired, might be positively
correlated, but conditional on the patient having a u they are independent (assuming that u
is the only common cause). Intuitively, the common causes screen o¤ the variables from each
other, in a sense that can be made precise by the technical notion of d-separation in a causal
Bayesian network; using the latter, one can also prove the Common Cause Principle from
a more basic property, the Parental Markov Condition (whereby any variable in the causal
network is probabilistically independent from its non-descendants given its parents; see Pearl
2000). Incidentally, causation can be indirect: the u might cause tiredness indirectly by rst
causing bad sleep, which then causes tiredness.
20Private causes also include background facts such as the voters genes, school education,
and so on. These are backgroundfacts insofar as (an interesting notion of) objective un-
certainty, as represented by Pr, treats them as xed. Indeed, it would be weird to imagine
a random experiment that randomly re-selects the voters school education while xing com-
mon causes such as the temperature of the court room. The xed private background causes,
of course, a¤ect the voters competence.
9
4 The variable-problem CJT: objective uncer-
tainty about voters and the decision problem
Perhaps most (not all) authors thinking about the CJT is better represen-
ted by envisaging a broader random process than that examined in Section 3:
one that generates not just peoples voting behaviour when faced with a given
problem, but also the problem itself. The problem might thus be viewed as ran-
domly drawn from a reference class of relevant problems, such as all criminal
court problems or all medical decision problems. One reason for introducing
objective uncertainty of the decision problem might be that we wish to eval-
uate how majority rule performs in general, say for all decision problems a
committee faces. Indeed, in order to justify majoritarianism as an institution
or as part of the constitution of a decision-making body, one has to consider
the whole class of decision problems to which majority rule will be applied.
Another reason for treating the decision problem as random might be that ob-
jective uncertainty/probability then comes closer to someones subjective un-
certainty/beliefs. Indeed, an observer will not know the problems true state or
its entire circumstances (in the broad sense introduced above).
4.1 The variable-problem CJT
The variable-problem framework and CJT require one to consider random vari-
ables X;V1; V2; :::, taking on values in the set f0; 1g, where the state variable
X represents the correct alternative and Vi represents individual is vote. The
probability function is now denoted P (not Pr) and represents objective un-
certainty under a random process generating peoples votes and their decision
problem. Section 3s probability function Pr can be interpreted as a conditional
probability function derived from P by conditionalising on a particular prob-
lem; see footnote 13. To make the state genuinely random, let the probability
that alternative 1 is correct, P (X = 1), be neither 0 nor 1.
Unlike in the xed-problem framework, the independence assumption now
requires the votes to be independent conditional on the state (i.e. on the correct
alternative) which is meaningful because the state is now random:
Independence (IND). The votes V1; V2; ::: of individuals 1, 2, ... are inde-
pendent conditional on X = 0, and also independent conditional on X = 1.
Again, in contrast to the xed-problem framework, conditional competence
is now a meaningful concept. For any alternative x (either 0 or 1), an individual
is competence given that alternative x is correct is the conditional probability
pxi := P (Vi = xjX = x) of voting for x given that x is correct. Individual is
(unconditional) competence is the unconditional probability pi = P (Vi = X)
of voting for the correct alternative; it is a combination of the two conditional
10
competence parameters:
pi = P (X = 0)p
0
i + P (X = 1)p
1
i .
The theorems competence assumption can again be stated in a stronger way
(that requires equally competent individuals) and in a weaker way (that requires
competence on average). The two competence conditions state as follows.
Competence (COM). For each alternative x 2 f0; 1g, conditional competence
pxi = P (Vi = xjX = x) exceeds 1=2 and is the same across individuals i.
Competence-on-average (COM) For each alternative x 2 f0; 1g, average
conditional competence px := limn!1(px1 + ::: + p
x
n)=n (exists
21 and) exceeds
1=2.
I now state the CJT in what I call the variable-problemversion. It holds
for the weaker competence assumption (COM), hence a fortiori for the stronger
one (COM).
The variable-problem CJT.22,23 If (IND) and (COM) hold, the probability
of a correct majority outcome, P (#fi  n : Vi = Xg > n=2), and also for each
alternative x 2 f0; 1g the conditional probability of a correct majority outcome,
P (#fi  n : Vi = xg > n=2jX = x), tend to one as the group size n tends to
innity.
Unlike in the xed-problem CJT, this time it is the independence assumption
that is problematic, as explained in the two following subsections. The criticism
of the variable-problem theorem will have a slightly di¤erent (and in a certain
21That is, the groups average conditional competence (px1+:::+p
x
n)=n converges as n!1,
a plausible assumption.
22For the sake of completeness, I mention another frequently used version of the classic
CJT, a variable-problem CJT that faces essentially the same analysis of its (problematic)
independence and (unproblematic) competence assumptions as the present variable-problem
CJT. The competence assumption is now that unconditional competence pi = P (Vi = X) be
larger than 1/2 and the same across individuals (or that average unconditional competence
be larger than 1/2). The independence assumption is that the events fV1 = Xg, fV2 = Xg,
... of correct votes by individuals 1, 2, ... be unconditionally independent. It follows that
the probability of a correct majority outcome, P (#fi  n : Vi = Xg > n=2), tends to 1 as
n!1.
23From a purely formal angle, one may re-interpret Section 3s xed-problem CJT as
a variable-problem CJT by changing the meaning of uncertainty. Indeed, let Section 3s
probability function Pr represent the conditional probability P (:jX = x) (rather than
P (X = x;C = c) as in footnote 13); that is, rather than xing the full problem, we x
only the state, not the circumstances. Then the conditions (Ind), (Com), and (Com) contain
halfof the conditions (IND), (COM), and (COM), respectively, and the theorem contains
halfof the variable-problem CJT. As a result, (Ind) rather than (Com) becomes the the-
orems problematic condition.
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respect more severe) status than that of the xed-problem theorem: one premise
is not just unknown to hold but even known not to hold.
The theorem also implies that, if (IND) and (COM) hold, the (Bayesian)
posterior probability of an alternative x (0 or 1) being correct given that there
is a majority for x converges to certainty:24
P (X = xj#fi  n : Vi = xg > n=2)! 1 as n!1.
4.2 Competence: holds usually
Informally, most individuals are competent because the problems with mislead-
ing circumstances form the minority of all problems. To make the argument for
competence more precise,25 let us think of the problem as drawn from a given
set  (reference class) of problems, e.g., a set of convict or acquitproblems.
Only to simplify the exposition, let  be nite and each problem have equal
probability to be picked. Then a persons competence can be identied with
the proportion of problems in  on which he judges the state correctly (recall
that a problem can be seen as a pair (x; c) of a state x, either 0 or 1, and
circumstances c, as explained earlier26). Competence is obviously sensitive to
the reference class : someone may be more competent within one reference
class than within another. Needless to say, one may easily construct an articial
reference class within which a given person is arbitrarily incompetent: simply
include only problems on which the person gets it wrong.
However, for a natural27 reference class   e.g., that of all convict or
acquitproblems but not that of all convict or acquitproblems with misleading
circumstances most voters competences within  should exceed 1/2. The
situation of incompetence on average not only appears rather extreme, but also
unstable: as soon as a person notices that he gets it wrong more often than
24Forming posterior probabilities of the state would not have made sense in the xed-
problem model of Section 3; there, the state is certain to take a given value, hence stays
certain to take this value after conditionalising on any event (such as on a majority outcome).
25To simplify the exposition, I phrase the argument in terms of peoples unconditional
competence rather than in terms of their conditional competence parameters p0i ; p
1
i to which
(Com) and (Com) refer. Our argument is easily adapted to conditional competence (by
considering not the entire class of problems  but the subclass of those problems whose true
state is 0, or of those problems whose true state is 1).
26Strictly speaking, a given problem (x; c) may not fully determine the persons vote, since
private factors may play a role (this is why voting behaviour was not treated as deterministic
in Section 3s xed-problem model). So voter is competence relative to reference class  is
not the proportion of problems (x; c) 2  on which he gets it right, but his average competence
within , given by 1jj
X
(x;c)2
p
(x;c)
i where p
(x;c)
i is is competence on problem (x; c).
27By naturalI mean that randomly drawing a problem from this class represents a realistic
or interesting kind of objective uncertainty. For instance, a realistic court is not confronted
only with trials with misleading circumstances (and even if were so, the instability argument
below would kick in).
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right, he can regain competence by simply inverting any of his judgments, i.e.,
systematically voting for what appears wrong to him.
4.3 Independence: usually violated in favour of positive
correlation
As argued in Section 3.3, any common cause/factor to the votes such as non-
private evidence or room temperature can induce correlation if this cause is
not held xed. What secured us the independence assumption in the xed-
problem model was precisely that we conditionalised on the problem, hence on
the circumstances which I have interpreted as containing the common causes.
As circumstances are not xed in the present model, independence is typically
violated. As a drastic example, suppose we learn that alternative 1 is correct
but that 99 of the rst 100 voters incorrectly vote 0. Then we can deduce that
most probably misleading circumstances are around misleading evidence, for
instance which in turn tells us that the remaining voter most probably votes
incorrectly too. But this violates (IND), since conditional on 1 being correct,
the votes of 99 voters should tell us nothing about how someone else votes. This
example also illustrates that it is positive correlation that is typically induced
by common causes.
5 A social planners subjective uncertainty
Objective uncertainty is a property of a random mechanism in the world. It is
usually not known to human observers (otherwise statistics would not exist as
a discipline). Should a social planner say, in charge of deciding between two
alternatives, or in charge of deciding whether majority rule is institutionalised
or written into the constitution believe in what the majority says? This, of
course, depends on what he knows about the abilities of voters and the di¢ culty
of the decision problem. Typically, he is uncertain both about voters (including
perhaps about their identity) and about the decision problems. So subjective
uncertainty looks more like uncertainty in a variable-problem framework than
uncertainty in a xed-problem framework.28 In Section 4s variable-problem set-
ting, let us now reinterpret P as an observers subjective probability function.
Modulo re-interpretations, much of the analysis of Section 4 still applies, that is:
while the competence assumption (COM) is usually unproblematic, independ-
ence (IND) does not apply to the observers beliefs. So the variable-problem
CJT does not apply to the observers beliefs; he need not be close-to-certain
that a large electorate gets it right.
28The case that the observer is certain about the problem is not only unusual but also
uninteresting: the observer then need not care about the majority outcome as he already
knows the correct alternative.
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The most notable reinterpretation needed is that a voter is correctness
probability pi = P (Vi = X) (and its two conditional variants p0i and p
1
i ) are
not interpretable anymore as is competence: pi measures how strongly the
observer believes that i gets it right. If the observer takes i to be a genius, pi
is close 1 even if i is objectively incapable. The conditions (COM) and (COM)
might be called trust conditions rather than competence conditions.
Ladha (1993) presents an interesting CJT in which probability is indeed
best interpreted as an observers subjective uncertainty. Ladha replaces the
(problematic) independence condition by the plausible assumption that votes
are exchangeable29, a condition that not only allows for strong correlations but
is also well-motivated if the observer knows nothing that allows him to distin-
guish between voters. Together with other technical conditions, Ladha shows
that majority outcomes are more probably correct than individual judgments,
but (except in extreme cases) do not converge to certainty as the group size
increases.
6 Game-theoretic models: votersown subject-
ive uncertainty
Rather recently, an interesting game-theoretic literature has developed around
the CJT (following Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; see also the citations in the
introduction). Compared to the classicCJT approach, the focus is changed in
at least four ways:
 The focus is not anymore on the objective or a social planners subjective
probability that majorities (democracies) nd correct decisions; rather the
relevant notion of uncertainty is uncertainty of the voters themselves, seen
as players involved in a strategic game created by the voting situation.
Accordingly, a voters probability of voting correctly does not anymore
measure his competence but the belief of the other players about whether
he votes correctly.
 Sincere voting is not anymore taken for granted, a clear progress. In
many models, it turns out that sincere voting is not rational: in a Nash
equilibrium, not all voters vote sincerely. I should, however, point out
that this relies on assuming that voterspreferences attach no intrinsic
value to being sincere, a disputable assumption in some contexts.30
 Voters are perfect Bayesian rationals. Each voter forms beliefs (subjective
probabilities) about the state by performing Bayesian updating on private
information. So non-evidential belief changes, e.g., through circumstances
29That is, the joint distribution of the random variables V1; V2; ::: stays the same if two
variables Vi and Vj (i 6= j) are exchanged, i.e. Vi is replaced by Vj and Vj by Vi.
30For instance, the judges in a legal court might attach a higher value to voting their sincere
opinion (say, following a professional vow) than to a correct verdict as the voting outcome.
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such as room temperature (see footnote 9) or through private causes such
as bad sleep, are excluded.31
 Voting is construed purely as a process of information pooling. Disagree-
ments between voters are seen as coming from distinct private informa-
tion.32 This excludes the case that disagreements are due to di¤erent in-
terpretations of the same information;33 disagreements of the latter kind
may persist even after people deliberate and the disagreement becomes
common knowledge between the voters. The standard game-theoretic
models exclude that voters agree to disagree prior to voting; if they do,
sincere voting is rational again.
What these points indicate is that the game-theoretic approach has brought
considerable new insights (by looking for explainingvoting behaviour), but has
done so under rather restrictive assumptions which the original CJT enquiry
was not making.
To come back to the central topic of this paper, what role (if any) do assump-
tions of independence and competence play in game-theoretic models? First of
all, since voting behaviour is not an input to the models but an output, the two
assumptions must be reformulated in terms of assumptions on private inform-
ation/signals. So the question is whether private signals are independent and
whether they are likely to indicate the truth34. Since probability reects subject-
ive uncertainty (of players), arguments similar to those given in Section 5 tell us
that we should be cautious mainly about independence assumptions. Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) independence assumption is part of what drives their
striking nding that sincere voting is (usually) not rational.
31But they could perhaps be modelled using Bayesian games with di¤erent prior beliefs. To
see why di¤erent priors are needed to capture non-evidential belief formation within players,
consider this example. Suppose each players beliefs about whether the defendant is guilty are
formed not based on evidence but solely on how well the player has slept. In a game-theoretic
model, a players type is then given by how well he has slept, and the beliefs held by type
 of a player are represented by the players conditional beliefs given that his type (sleep) is
. So, in a player is beliefs prior to becoming a type (prior to sleeping), his type (sleep) is
correlated with whether the defendant is guilty (which is only a metaphor: the player never
held such absurd beliefs). But in other playersbeliefs, no correlation should exist between
is type (sleep) and whether the defendant is guilty. So the model needs to assign di¤erent
players di¤erent prior beliefs.
32Some model renements also include di¤erences in preferences, or costs of acquiring in-
formation.
33By di¤erent interpretationsI do not refer to cases with a hidden form of di¤erent in-
formation. One way to capture di¤erence in interpretation is through di¤erent prior beliefs.
See footnote 31.
34As noted above, the probability that a player receives a truth-indicating signal is not
interpretable as the players competence but as the other players uncertainty about this
players information; accordingly, the term competenceis rarely used in the game-theoretic
literature.
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7 Concluding remarks
In the literature, many jury theorems are derived that, though mathematically
interesting, su¤er from problematic premises. Whether a premise is justied
depends on the notion of uncertainty; possibly the most interesting notions
include uncertainty about the decision problem (with its specic circumstances),
be it objective uncertainty (as in Section 4) or a social planners subjective
uncertainty (as in Section 5). For such uncertainty, independence assumptions
become problematic.
The doubts that the game-theoretic approach has cast on the hypothesis of
sincere voting should be taken seriously, though I have also indicated that the
game-theoretic approach may itself have to be modied, possibly rehabilitating
the rationality of sincere voting.
Future research should concentrate on jury theorems with justiable premises.
A good indicator for whether premises are justied is whether the conclusion is
prima facie plausible. In my view, the conclusion of non-asymptotic jury theor-
ems (namely that groups are more competent than smaller groups or single in-
dividuals) is plausible. And the conclusion of asymptotic jury theorems (namely
that majority correctness tends to one as the group size increases) is usually
only plausible if the model allows one to re-interpret a correctdecision as one
that is justiedbased on all available information (spread over the voters);
under this re-interpretation, asymptotic jury theorems explore conditions for
majority voting to successfully aggregate information in the limit.35
A Proof of the two theorems
Though well-known, let me give simple proofs of the two theorems above.
Proof of the xed-problem CJT. Assume (Ind) and (Com). Suppose x = 1
(the proof is analogous if x = 0). As one easily checks, the random variables
Vi   pi, i = 1; 2; :::; have zero expectation. As they are also independent, the
law of large numbers applies: Pr
 
limn!1 1n
nX
i=1
(Vi   pi)! 0
!
= 1. Using that
limn!1 1n
nX
i=1
pi ! p, it follows that Pr
 
limn!1 1n
nX
i=1
Vi ! p
!
= 1. So (since
convergence with probability one implies stochastic convergence), for each  > 0
we have Pr
 p  1n
nX
i=1
Vi
 < 
!
! 1. Choosing  su¢ ciently small (namely
35For instance, acquit is the justied decision (the full-informationdecision) whenever
evidence for guilt is insu¢ cient, even if the defendant is truly guilty. In particular, Miller
(1986), Ladha (1995), and part of the game-theoretic literature seem to interpret correctness
along these lines.
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 = p  1=2), it follows that Pr
 
1
n
nX
i=1
Vi > 1=2
!
! 1, i.e. that
Pr
 
nX
i=1
Vi > n=2
!
= Pr (#fi  n : Vi = 1g > n=2)! 1: 
Proof of the variable-problem CJT. The two premises (IND) and (COM)
guarantee that, for each state x in f0; 1g, the conditional probability function
P (:jX = x) satises the premises (Ind) and (Com) of the xed-problem CJT.
So, by the latter, P (#fi  n : Vi = xg > n=2jX = x) ! 1. So, letting An be
the event that #fi  n : Vi = xg > n=2, we have
P (An) =
1X
x=0
P (AnjX = x)P (X = x)!
1X
x=0
1  P (X = x) = 1. 
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